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Abstract Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution. In this
paper, the importance of prescribing physicians’ imperfect agency is tested using the fact that
some Swiss jurisdictions allow physicians to dispense drugs on their own account (physician
dispensing, PD) while others disallow it. We estimate a model of physician drug choice with
the help of drug claim data, finding a significant positive association between PD and the
use of generics. While this points to imperfect agency, generics are prescribed more often to
patients with high copayments or low incomes.
Keywords Physician agency · Prescribing behavior · Drug dispensing ·
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Introduction
Policy makers around the world seek to encourage generic substitution (i.e. the replacement
of brand-name by generic drugs) in an attempt to reduce the pharmaceutical bill. In the
United States for instance, several state policies promote the use of generic products by
Medicaid beneficiaries (CMS 2004). Similar initiatives exist in Germany (Leutgeb et al.
2009), Sweden (Andersson et al. 2007), Switzerland (Decollogny and Ruggli 2006), and
Japan (Matsuda 2008). To be successful, these initiatives must be aligned with prescribing
physicians’ (or pharmacists’) incentives. Generic substitution not only requires effort and
time on the part of these professionals but also entails the risk of meeting with patient
resistance. Three components of prescribers’ utility can work to overcome resistance against
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generic substitution. First, prescribers may earn higher contributions to income from generic
than from brand-named drugs. Second, acting as agents by taking patients’ total (rather than
merely health-related) utility into account, physicians are predicted to prescribe the generic
if the savings accruing to the patient are important enough. Third, in view of public concern
about growing health care expenditure, cost savings accruing to insurers might motivate
physicians to prescribe lower-priced generic drugs.
In this context, evidence from Switzerland is of considerable interest. In some Swiss
jurisdictions (cantons), physicians are allowed to dispense drugs to their patients on their
own account. This setting will be referred to as ‘physician dispensing’ (PD) in the remainder
of this paper.1 In the remaining jurisdictions, physicians are obliged to let a pharmacy fill
their prescriptions. Thus, both the PD and the non-PD (i.e. pharmacy-based) setting can be
observed under otherwise very similar conditions. PD may well affect generic substitution
provided physicians act as imperfect agents and given that generic drugs differ from brand-
name drugs in terms of their contribution to physician income.
Retail prices paid by patients are regulated to be equal for all drug sellers (physicians
and pharmacies). The contribution to the sellers’ income, then, is the difference between
manufacturers’ prices and retail prices. Concerning manufacturers’ prices, there is room
for discounts and individual bargaining, causing the effective contributions to income to be
unknown. However, several factors indicate that contributions to physician income can be
higher for generic than for brand-name drugs. First, many generic alternatives are usually
available for the same brand-name drug, leading to fierce competition for access to prescribers
among generic producers. Second, the retail prices of generic drugs are markedly higher in
Switzerland than in comparable European countries, suggesting that generic producers have
ample leeway for rebates to prescribers.2 Third, while there is no public information about
such rebates, interviews conducted with Swiss wholesalers and physicians support the notion
that prescribers derive more income from generic than brand-name drugs.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a short review
of the literature. Section 3 describes the institutional setting. Section 4 presents a theoret-
ical model of physician prescribing behavior, along with a set of testable hypotheses. The
empirical strategy used for hypothesis testing is explained in Sect. 5. Section 6 contains a
description of the data. Results are shown in Sect. 7, while Sect. 9 rounds off with a summary
and conclusions.
Literature review
To keep this survey concise, there will be no discussion of research into physician behavior
in general. Rather, focus is on prescribing behavior. An early pertinent study is the one by
Morton-Jones and Pringle (1993), who compare prescription patterns of PD and non-PD
providers in the UK, finding that the share of generic drugs is lower in the PD segment. Liu et
al. (2009) analyze the choice between generic and brand-name drugs in Taiwan, where PD is
the dominant mode. According to them, financial incentives markedly influence this choice.
Specifically, providers on a global budget are more likely to prescribe generic drugs than
those reimbursed fee-for-service. Moreover, cheaper brand-name drugs (which in Taiwan
1 PD is the counterpart of prescribing pharmacists, who exist e.g. in the case of refills in the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand (Emmerton et al. 2005). In both cases, the prescriber and the
dispenser is one and the same person or institution, respectively.
2 The prices for brand-name drugs are also higher in Switzerland, but the markups for physicians are smaller
(see Sect. 3.2).
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contribute less to physician income, as in Switzerland) are more often replaced by generics
than expensive ones. Using Japanese data on hypertension drug sales, Iizuka (2007) concludes
that markups available to physicians significantly influence drug choice. However, he also
finds that physicians take the cost of the drug to their patients into account. Finally, the 2000
reform in South Korea provides an interesting natural experiment. At that time, both drug
dispensing by physicians and drug prescribing by independent pharmacists were outlawed.
Descriptive statistics presented by Kim and Ruger (2008) indicate a marked increase in the
market share of high-price drugs in the year following the reform. However, the longer-term
effects of the reform could not be assessed on the basis of their data.
Papers that are methodically related to ours are Hellerstein (1998), Lundin (2000), and
Hellstrom and Rudholm (2010). They analyze the choice between generic and brand-name
drugs in a non-PD setting. Hellerstein argues that physicians bear higher information costs
when prescribing generic rather than brand-name drugs because they have more personal
experience with the brand-name than with the generic drugs. Contrary to the hypothesis of
perfect agency, she finds that prescription is not influenced by patients’ insurance status and
hence financial burden. However, physicians who predominately treat patients in capitated
or Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) settings are more likely to prescribe generics
(controlling for individual insurance status). Her panel data specification also shows that a
large part of the unexplained variance is physician-specific, which also holds true of Lundin’s
contribution. Interestingly, Lundin argues that physicians may want to honor R&D expen-
diture and pioneering effort by innovators, causing them to bear added psychic cost when
prescribing a generic. He finds evidence that higher cost to the patient through copayment
increases the probability of generics being prescribed, while higher cost to the insurer does
not. Hellstrom and Rudholm argue that the uncertainty about the quality of generic drugs
incites physicians to prescribe brand-name drugs. Their empirical evidence shows that physi-
cians are indeed less likely to allow generic substitution for older (and presumably sicker)
patients. However, their measure of uncertainty about quality came out insignificant in the
decision equation.
Another reason why the prescription of generic drugs might require extra effort on the part
of the physician is given by Griliches and Cockburn (1994). They argue that many patients
perceive generic drugs as less safe and of lower quality, making the patient suffer a ‘putative
loss’ when using them. Therefore, a physician prescribing the generic drug needs to convince
the patient of its bioequivalence.
To our knowledge, there is no Swiss study that analyzes the effect of PD on the choice
between generic and brand-name drugs. The one exception is Hunkeler (2008) who presents
corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that PD leads to margin optimization or even mar-
gin maximization3 through dispensing packages and dosages with higher official physician
margins. These packages are launched first by companies entering the generics market; later,
they are complemented by additional package sizes and dosages (for more institutional detail
regarding Swiss health insurance, see Sect. 3). The other studies of PD in Switzerland have
focused on its impact on total physician billings or health care expenditure (HCE), respec-
tively. An early investigation by Zweifel (1985) concluded that while PD creates incentives to
keep patients out of the hospital (where different physicians are in charge as a rule), the sav-
ings achieved through a reduced rate of hospitalization fall short of the extra drug expenditure
induced in ambulatory care. At a more aggregate level, Dummermuth (1993) compares two
otherwise similar neighboring cantons (Lucerne with PD and Argovia without PD), finding
3 The difference between margin optimization and maximization is that in the first case, PD providers prescribe
several small packages instead of one large package while in the second case, they prescribe a higher quantity
to maximize their income.
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PD to be associated with slightly higher per capita drug expenditure as well as HCE. This
finding is in line with Beck et al. (2004), who relate per-capita drug expenditure to several
properties of cantons, among them, their PD status. By way of contrast, Vatter and Ruefli
(2003), who control for a very comprehensive set of political and socioeconomic covariates,
indentify a significantly negative effect of the share of PD providers on per capita HCE. More
surprisingly still, Schleiniger et al. (2007) estimate a significantly negative effect of PD on
cantonal drug expenditure which is robust across several specifications.
Institutional setting
Basic health insurance coverage in Switzerland written by some 80 competing private not-
for-profit insurers is mandatory for a broad basket of services and drugs. Physicians in private
practice are mostly paid according to a nationwide uniform fee schedule called TARMED
[see Zweifel and Tai-Seale (2009) for description and criticism].4 Provision of health care is
decentralized and the 26 Swiss cantons (‘jurisdictions’) have considerable say in its regula-
tion, including the regulation of drug dispensing.
Physicians’ dispensing rights
Thirteen of the twenty-six Swiss cantons give dispensing rights to all physicians, seven apply
mixed systems while six generally disallow PD. Physicians who dispense on average derive
about 18 % of their revenue from PD. This number is higher for general practitioners (28 %)
and lower for specialists (8 %) (see Hunkeler 2008). Therefore, the financial incentives linked
with the amount and structure of PD are substantial. Acknowledging problems of asymmetric
information between physicians and patients, some cantons with PD require physicians to
inform patients about their right to obtain a prescription to be filled by the pharmacy of their
choice.
In the context of the present study, an important question is whether cantons that allow
PD attract substantially different types of physicians than do non-PD cantons. Since the data
is provided by a health insurer, they do not contain information about the determinants of
locational choice such as regional origin of the physician and her spouse, or the location
of her medical school. This makes an analysis of physicians’ choice of location impossi-
ble. Moreover, it is known that young physicians mainly take over existing practices rather
than opening new ones in response to large administrative hurdles, resulting in a narrowed
choice of location. Still, if physicians who are very susceptible to financial incentives are
disproportionately located in the PD cantons, our estimates in Sect. 7 might be upwardly
biased.5
Physicians in cantons without PD write prescriptions to be filled by a pharmacy of
the patient’s choice. The same is true for non-dispensing physicians in cantons with PD.
In contrast to other countries, prescriptions in Switzerland contain the names of specific
pharmaceuticals, not of active agents. Pharmacists are allowed to substitute the prescribed
pharmaceutical by a cheaper generic on the condition that they inform the prescribing physi-
cian. However, as this requires considerable effort, generic substitution by pharmacies is
not widely practiced. Being subject to coinsurance, patients have an incentive to ask for the
4 A small number of physicians works in managed-care type arrangements, where other modes of payment
are possible.
5 This may be true although dummy variables for cantons and community types are included in the estimation
in order to control for differences between regions (see Sect. 7).
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cheaper generic as long as they have not reached their stop-loss limit. This incentive is the
same across all cantons of Switzerland, irrespective of their PD legislation.
In the context of the present study, it is important to note that the prices of drugs are
regulated and the same regardless of whether they are dispensed by a physician or a pharmacy.
In addition, copayments as described in Sect. 3.3 do not differ between the PD and the non-PD
modes.
Contributions to income from drug dispensing
For non-PD practitioners, the contribution to income from dispensing is zero. For PD prac-
titioners, the contribution earned by selling a specific drug consists of three components,
namely (i) a fixed lump sum, (ii) a percentage of the regulated manufacturer price, and
(iii) discounts that are conceded to physicians by pharmaceutical companies. The first two
components are regulated by the government and published in official registers. The third
component is the outcome of an individual bargaining process between prescriber and sales
representative, which is unobservable to us. However, they ultimately reflect the bargaining
position of the pharmaceutical company, about which a few facts are known.
According to Liu et al. (2009), the discount on manufacturers’ prices offered increases with
market size, competition, and retail price but decreases with marginal cost. First, market size is
small in Switzerland for both brand-name and generic drugs. With regard to competition, the
market usually contains one brand-name drug only but a large number of generic alternatives
(more than 10 in this analysis). Therefore, producers of generic drugs are more likely to use
discounts in their attempt to increase market share. Next, marginal cost of brand-name and
generic drugs can be assumed equal in the present setting.
In addition, international comparisons of reimbursement prices offer indirect evidence
suggesting that generic producers in Switzerland have ample leeway for discounts. For fixing
the reimbursement price of brand-name drugs, Switzerland uses a reference group comprising
Germany, Denmark, UK, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Austria. Reimbursement prices
for generic drugs have to be at least 40 % lower than those of the original drug. However,
this does not imply that generic producers earn lower effective margins. In fact, Santesuisse
(2009) and IMS (2009) calculate price indexes for drugs with and without patent protection
for Switzerland and the seven countries cited above. The two studies conclude that both prices
for band-name (pb) and generic drugs (pg) are higher in Switzerland, i.e. pb = pb− pRb > 0
and pg = pg − pRg > 0, where R denotes the average drug price in the reference group. But
they also find that the international price difference is larger in the case of generic than for
brand-name drugs (pg > pb).6 Assuming that producers have the same cost structure in
Switzerland and elsewhere, the extra profit margin earned in Switzerland is therefore higher
for generic than for brand-name producers, i.e. m˜ = pg − pb > 0. They can use their net
advantage m˜ for inducing physicians to prescribe their products.
In all, manufacturers of generic drugs are likely to offer larger discounts to physicians than
brand-name producers. Indeed, interviews conducted with Swiss wholesalers and physicians
support the notion that prescribers derive more income from generic drugs, although no
market participant is willing to publish the exact discounts that are offered or accepted.
6 The regulation of reimbursement allows generic producers to charge higher prices in Switzerland than
elsewhere in Europe. In Switzerland, generic drugs have to be at least 40 % cheaper than the brand-name
drugs. Thereafter, insurers are obliged to reimburse each price that is set by generic producers. By way of
contrast, many European countries install reimbursement ceilings that are oriented towards the cheapest prices
that are offered in the market (internal reference pricing, Vogler et al. 2008). If the price exceeds the ceiling,
the difference needs to be paid by the insured, which is avoided by most generic producers.
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In the context of the present study, it is important to note that the law forbids to give,
promise or accept any monetary or monetary equivalent reward for the prescription of a
specific drug. Therefore, manufacturers are not allowed to promise rewards (for example
higher discounts) for the achievement of a higher sales volume.
Copayment arrangements
Prescription drugs are covered by compulsory health insurance, which kicks in when the
annual deductible is exceeded. The minimum annual deductible amounts to CHF 300
(1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD at 2011 exchange rates). Voluntary deductibles range from CHF 500
to 2,500 and are chosen by the insured at the beginning of the year. The deductible applies to
all health care services except those related to maternity. When the deductible is exceeded,
there is a 10 % rate of coinsurance up to a stop-loss of CHF 700 per year, independent of
the chosen deductible. For instance, a patient with a deductible of CHF 2,500 would spend
a maximum of CHF 3,200 out of pocket. For certain brand-name drugs, the rate of coinsur-
ance was increased to 20 % during our observation period (2005–2007) to increase generic
substitution. Prior to this policy change, the coinsurance rate was 10 % regardless of drug
version. Under the new regulation, producers of brand-name drugs can escape this increased
coinsurance by lowering their prices. As a consequence of different deductibles and changing
rates of coinsurance, some patients have a stronger interest in receiving cheaper drugs than
others.
Theoretical model of physicians’ drug choice
Because of their central role in the resource allocation in health care markets, the behavior
of physicians has spawned a very rich literature (see McGuire 2000 for an overview). The
purpose of this section is to derive testable hypotheses concerning generic drug substitution
from existing theoretical models. Many of these models posit patients’ health benefit as an
argument in the physician’s objective function. Thus, a physician (i) who prescribes a drug
(d) to a patient ( j) at time (t) has utility
Vi jdt = αi
[
πidt − ei jdt
] + βi
[
b jd − θ jdt pdt u′{Y jt }
] − γi
[
(1 − θ jdt )pdt
] (1)
with πidt = fdt + vdt pdt + ηidt .
Here, πidt denotes the contribution to physician income. As explained in Sect. 3.2, it
consists of a fixed lump sum ( fdt ), a price-dependent component (vdt pdt ), and an unobserved
discount that is the outcome of an individual bargaining process between the physician and
the pharmaceutical company (ηidt ). For the reasons listed in Sect. 3.2, we assume that both
discounts and total contributions to physician incomes are higher for generic than for brand-
name drugs.
The effort (in money terms) associated with prescribing is denoted ei jdt . In keeping with
the literature cited in Sect. 2, this effort is higher for a generic (d = g) than a brand-name
(d = b) drug. For simplicity, the cost of prescribing b is normalized to zero (ei jbt = 0). The
higher prescribing effort for generic drugs stems from two main sources. First, the physician
needs to gather personal experience with the generic drug, which she has already collected
for the brand-name drug during the period of patent protection. This cost decreases over
time, hence the dependence on time index t . Still, every patient is different, making matching
patients with drugs challenging even after an initial information effort. Second, the physician
needs to convince the patient that the lower-priced generic drug is not of lower quality.
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Table 1 Types of (im)perfect agency
Types of agency Parameter values
Physician Patient Society
Perfect agency αi = 0 βi > 0 γi > 0
Imperfect agency on behalf of patients αi > 0 βi > 0 γi ≥ 0
Imperfect agency on behalf of insurers αi > 0 βi ≥ 0 γi > 0
Lack of agency αi > 0 βi = 0 γi = 0
Otherwise, the patient might suffer a ‘putative loss’ in the sense of Griliches and Cockburn
(1994), which might jeopardize the physician’s reputation. This cost also declines over time
as patients become acquainted with the generic drug. The parameter αi > 0 in Eq. (1)
denotes the weight the physician attaches to the drug’s contribution to income. It may well
differ between GPs and specialists.
The second term of Eq. (1) symbolizes net patient benefit. Therefore, a weight βi > 0
(with no systematic difference between GPs and specialists assumed) reflects a consideration
for the patient’s total utility derived from health benefit and disposable income (Bradley and
Lesu 2006; De Jaegher and Jegers 2000) rather than merely for the patient’s health benefit
(Ellis and McGuire 1986). Net patient benefit equals health benefit b jd minus the drug’s
out-of-pocket price θ jdt pdt , with θ jdt denoting the patient’s rate of coinsurance (which can
be drug-specific) and pdt , the price of the drug. The patient’s utility from consuming other
goods is u{Y jt }, which is increasing and concave in patient’s income Y jt as well as additively
separable from health. Since copayment for a single drug θ jdt pdt is small in our context,
multiplying it by u′{Y jt } yields a good approximation of its impact on patient utility. As
low-income patients have a high marginal utility of income, they suffer a particularly high
utility loss from a given drug cost θ jdt pdt . In the remainder of this paper, there will be no
difference in health benefits between the brand-name and the generic drugs (b jb = b jg)
because bioequivalent drugs are compared (see Sect. 6 for details).
The third term of Eq. (1) is motivated by agency on behalf of the insurers. Agency towards
insurers can be motivated by fear of sanctions or tighter regulation in future.7 Both types
of threats concern GPs and specialists alike. Moreover, high and rapidly increasing health
insurance premiums are one of the top concerns of the Swiss population. Therefore, promoting
a cost-efficient practice style could create a warm-glow effect of doing what is good for
society. Here, (1 − θ jdt )pdt symbolizes the cost of the drug treatment falling on the patient’s
insurer, with γi > 0 indicating the importance of this concern. In view of Eq. (1), types of
(im)perfect agency can be defined as in Table 1.
The generic drug is prescribed if Vi jgt > Vi jbt , hence
Vi jgt − Vi jbt = αiψ
[
πigt − πibt − ei jgt
] + βi
[
(θ jbt pbt − θ jgt pgt )u′{Y jt }
] (2)
+γi
[
(1 − θ jbt )pbt − (1 − θ jgt )pgt )
]
> 0.
Physician agency can now be analyzed with the help of Eq. (2). To begin with, non-dispensing
physicians do not obtain income from drug prescription (πigt = πibt = 0), while dispensing
physicians are likely to receive a higher income contribution from generic than from brand-
7 The Swiss health insurers’ association (Santesuisse) scrutinizes physicians who exhibit inexplicably high
cost of treatment compared to their peers and occasionally sues them.
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name drugs (πigt > πibt > 0, see Sect. 3.2).8 PD is therefore expected to increase the
prescription of generic drugs.
Hypothesis 1 Given imperfect or lack of agency, dispensing physicians are more likely to
prescribe a generic drug compared to non-dispensing ones due to its higher income contri-
bution.
Recall that due to bioequivalence, drug choice affects patient utility exclusively through
differences in coinsurance. According to Eq. (2), both perfect and imperfect patient-related
agency thus leads to the prediction that generic drugs are prescribed more often to patients
with a high rate of coinsurance (high θ jdt ) or low income (high marginal utility of income,
u′{Y jt }), than to other patients.
Hypothesis 2 Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are prescribed
more often to patients with higher rate of coinsurance as long as the brand-name drug is more
expensive than the generic, pbt > pgt .
Hypothesis 3 Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, generic drugs are prescribed
more to patients with lower incomes because of their higher marginal utility of income.
For the decision whether or not to prescribe a generic drug, only the sign of Eq. (2) is relevant.
If the first term of Eq. (2) is zero (as for all non-dispensing physicians), the second term
becomes relatively more important for the determination of its sign. Therefore, to the extent
that agency motivates physicians to prescribe generic drugs, the effect of patient coinsurance
should be more marked for non-PD providers.
Hypothesis 4 Given imperfect agency on behalf of patients, patients’ rate of coinsurance is
more influential if the physician does not dispense drugs on his or her own account.
Many models of physician agency neglect the third term of Eq. (2). However, if the
influence of copayment represented by [(θ jbt pbt − θ jgt pgt )u′{Y jt }] is low and (πigt − πibt )
is zero, as applies to non-PD providers, all that remains is the (extra) effort of prescribing the
generic ei jgt . Therefore, non-PD providers who treat patients with low coinsurance or high
incomes should have a very low propensity to prescribe generics due to their higher cost of
effort. It takes agency towards the payers of health care [γi > 0 in Eq. (2)] to make them
prescribe a generic.
Hypothesis 5 Given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers prescribe generic drugs
to some degree.
In addition to the standard fee-for-service arrangement, Swiss insurers may also offer policies
with managed care-type restrictions. Most of these arrangements are aimed at increasing the
cost-consciousness of physicians, either by introducing provider cost sharing or by selectively
contracting physicians based on indication of efficiency. In both cases, these arrangements
are expected to align the interests of physicians with those of the insurers, resulting in an
increased influence of the price difference (pbt − pgt ) on physicians in managed care-settings.
Hypothesis 6 Physicians working in managed care-type settings prescribe more generic
drugs because of their increased consideration of the cost of care.
8 In fact, non-dispensing physicians get a fee (TARMED) for prescribing a drug, which however does not
differ between brand-name and generic drugs. This fee is therefore irrelevant to our analysis.
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A limitation of our model is that it focuses on physician utility only. This is justified
to the extent that asymmetric information about treatment options makes patients delegate
their decision-making authority to physicians. However, this delegation is unlikely to be
complete in practice. If patients play a more active role, observed choices are the outcome of
a bargaining process between them and physicians (Ellis and McGuire 1990). It is important
to keep this limitation in mind when interpreting the empirical results in Sect. 7. For example,
the patient’s rate of coinsurance may impact drug choice not only because of physician agency
(as our model suggests), but also because of the patients’ own actions.
Econometric specification
We estimate the choice between brand-name and generic drugs using a binary choice model.
The dependent variable takes on the value one if the physician prescribes g and zero otherwise.
Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), the physician’s utility is split into a deterministic
and a random component, i.e. Ui jdt = Vi jdt + εi jdt , where εi jdt is unobserved by the
researcher. A physician prescribes drug g instead of b if and only if Ui jgt > Ui jbt . Hence,
the probability of physician i prescribing g to patient j at time t is given by
Pi jgt = Pr(Vi jgt + εi jgt > Vi jbt + εi jbt ) = Pr(Vi jgt − Vi jbt > εi jbt − εi jgt ) (3)
with Vi jgt − Vi jbt given by Eq. (2). If we assume the random term εi j t ≡ εi jbt − εi jgt to have
a logistic distribution, we get the logit choice probability
Pi jgt =
(
1 + e−(Vi jgt −Vi jbt )
)−1
(4)
which permits to derive and interpret odds ratios. The drawback of the logit model compared
to the probit is that no simple estimators are available as soon as a physician-specific random
effect is included. In the probit model, the linear combination of the normal error term and
the normal random effect results in a normal distribution. This is not the case for the logit
model (see Wooldridge 2002, Chap. 15). By including a physician-specific error term, we
allow for within correlation among the observations belonging to the same physician while
still assuming independence of observations across physicians. The physician-specific error
captures unobserved factors that we are not able to control for (see also Lundin 2000).
Examples of unobserved factors that may affect drug choice are favorable experience with
a specific drug or the impact of pharmaceutical sales representatives visiting the physician.
Therefore, we extend the random utility model above to allow for a physician-specific random
effect, i.e. Ui jdt = Vi jdt +νi +εi jdt . If ν ∼ N (0, σ 2ν ) one obtains the one-level random-effects
logit model (see Wooldridge 2002, Chap. 15), with the share of total variance contributed by
physician-level variance given by ρ = σ 2ν /(σ 2ν + σ 2ε ) where σ 2ε denotes the variance of the
overall error term. In addition, one could allow for patient-specific random effects by nesting
them with physician-level ones, resulting in a two-level hierarchical regression model (also
called mixed-effects model, see Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2001). While theoretically attractive, the
mixed-effects model could not be estimated due to the complexity of the estimation equation
and the size of the dataset.9 Therefore, we estimated the one-level random-effects model
discussed previously. Testing the importance of the physician-specific error term using a
likelihood ratio test showed that the one-level random-effects model performed better than
the pooled logit regression.
9 The mixed-effects model did not converge using Stata 10.
123
124 M. Rischatsch et al.
Table 2 Overview of the variables used for hypothesis testing
Variable Term No. of Eq. (2) Hyp. No. Exp. sign Confirmed?
PD 1 1 + Y (O,A)
General Practitioner (GP) 1 n.a. + Y
Interaction of PD and GP 1 1 + Y
Deductible category (DED2, DED3) 2 2 + Y (O,A)
Interaction of PD and DED2, DED3 2 4 – N
Increased rate of coinsurance (COINS) 2 2 + Y
Interaction of PD and COINS 2 4 – N
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 2 3 – Y
Accident coverage (ACC) 2 3 – Y (O,A)
High income area (HIA) 2 3 – Y (O,A)
Price difference (P) 3 5 + N (Y for O)
Interaction of PD and P 2, 3 n.a. – N (Y for O)
HMO contract (HMO) 3 6 + Y
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) 3 6 + Y
Control variables: six area types, 25 cantonal dummies, complementary insurance, time trend, patient age and
sex, dosage, prescriptions per patient, year of first prescription
O omeprazole; A amlodipine
To estimate the coefficients of interest, the systematic component of the utility function
(Vi jgt −Vi jbt ) needs to be specified. Unfortunately, it is not possible to unambiguously relate
the variables of the theoretical model to observed quantities. Still, it is possible to test all the
hypotheses that were stated in Sect. 4. The assignments are displayed in Table 2.
As explained in Sect. 3.2, we cannot observe the true income contribution from physician
dispensing, but we expect it to be higher for generic than for brand-name drugs [πigt −
πibt > 0 in Eq. (2)]. Therefore, we can only include a dummy that indicates whether or
not a physician earns an income contribution from dispensing (P Dit = 1). We expect the
coefficient pertaining to the income contribution to be positive, implying that PD increases
the probability of choosing g.
The information cost (ei jgt ) in Eq. (2) cannot be measured and thus is absorbed by the
random term. A dummy for general practitioners (GP) is interacted with PD to test for
systematic differences in αi of Eq. (2), i.e. whether GPs react in a different way to the
financial incentives from PD than specialists do. A positive interaction effect is expected due
to the lower average income of GPs and hence higher marginal utility of income.
Copayment borne by patients is known from the patient’s health insurance policy on the
one hand and the drug-specific rate of coinsurance on the other. As explained in Sect. 3.3,
policies differ in terms of deductibles (DED). Physicians acting as agents [βi > 0 in Eq. (2)]
would want to keep patients’ out-of-pocket cost low. The higher DED, the more they are
expected to prescribe the cheaper generic (Hypothesis 2). In formulating this hypothesis,
DED is viewed as exogenous. Admittedly, high deductibles are typically chosen by higher-
income individuals, making θ jdt a function of u{Y jt } in Eq. (2). However, the dataset lacks
information that would permit to control for this relationship. Hypothesis (2) can be detailed
further. Before January 2006, drug expenditure in excess of DED was subject to a 10 %
coinsurance rate regardless of type g or b. A natural experiment is provided by the policy
change of 2006, when the coinsurance rate for (some) brand-name drugs was increased
from 10 to 20 % while it stayed at 10 % for generics. Producers of brand-name drugs can
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Table 3 Sample shares and sales volumes of generic and brand-name drugs
Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
Physician dispensed? Yes No Yes No Yes No
Sample share of generics 94 % 89 % 82 % 66 % 86 % 79 %
Sales of genericsa 6.3 9.2 3.7 3.5 2.0 1.7
Sales of brand-namesa 1.0 2.8 1.5 3.1 0.4 0.6
a Values are shown in CHF, mn. for the period between March 2005 and December 2007. 1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD
at 2011 exchange rates
escape the increased rate of coinsurance by lowering their prices, which is observed in our
dataset (see Sect. 6). The effect of the patient’s rate of coinsurance on drug choice can be
tested by including a dummy COINS that is one if the prescribed drug faces the increased
rate of coinsurance at the time of purchase and zero otherwise. In addition, an interaction
term PD·COINS serves to test for the influence of financial incentives on physician agency.
According to Hypothesis 4, its coefficient is predicted to be negative, indicating less additional
generic substitution in the case of PD.
The hypothesis that generic drugs are prescribed less to patients with higher income due
to their lower marginal utility of income (Hypothesis 3) is tested by including dummies for
residence in a high-income area (HIA), the purchase of extra hospital insurance (HOSP),
and the purchase of accident insurance (ACC). Accident coverage is inversely related to
labor force participation because it is usually provided by the employer rather than the health
insurer. It thus may be interpreted as an indicator of high income, causing less prescription
of generics according to Hypothesis 3.
As to the third term of Eq. (2), Hypothesis 5 (bearing on γi , the role of agency on behalf of
insurers) can be tested using the price difference between the brand-name and generic drug
(pt = pbt − pgt ), to be detailed below. Concerning the relevance of this agency, the following
argument can be made. Beyond the deductible, the price difference borne by patients is very
small compared to average income. Thus, it is unlikely that consideration for the patients’
coinsurance [second term in Eq. (2)] provides enough motivation for most of non-dispensing
physicians to bear the greater cost of prescribing generic drugs (ei jgt ). Therefore, the fact
that the market share of generic drugs in our dataset is substantial in the non-PD setting (see
Table 3) supports the view that γi > 0 in Eq. (2), suggesting that physicians do consider
the cost to insurers when choosing a drug. The interaction term PD·P is used to test whether
physician agency is weakened by PD. As the price difference is part of both the second and
the third term of Eq. (2), both agency on behalf of insurers or agency on behalf of patients
could be affected here.
For calculating the price difference, note that it has to be determined for each combination
of package size and dosage, with pgt denoting the average price of N generic products each
time. Further, since prices are subject to change, the price difference for a specific size-dosage
combination has to be calculated for each month t , i.e. pt = pbt − (∑n pnt )/N ∀n = g.
For some of these combinations, only one version is available and no price difference can
be calculated. These observations are excluded from the regression analysis. This is not a
problem because a prescriber who needs this specific amount of pills and dose does not have
a choice between b and g.
For testing Hypothesis 6, differences in health insurance policies can be exploited. Apart
from conventional fee-for-service contracts with varying deductibles, consumers can opt
for a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or a gatekeeping alternative (GATE). In
the HMO setting, physicians are paid by capitation rather than the usual fee-for-service.
123
126 M. Rischatsch et al.
The gatekeeping arrangement uses fee-for-service payments but requires patients to obtain a
referral from their general practitioner (chosen from a list issued by their insurer) before seeing
a specialist. Moreover, patients in a gatekeeping plan are required to ask for generic drugs.
Hypothesis 6 states that both kinds of arrangements should lead to increased consideration of
the cost of care by prescribing physicians [higher γi in Eq. (2)] and hence more generic drugs
being prescribed. However, it is important to note that patients choosing these contracts are
likely less risk-averse and more price sensitive than patients opting for the standard fee-for-
service setting. These differences relate to the second rather than third term of Eq. (2) yet
also contribute to more generic drugs being prescribed.
We complete the econometric specification by a few control variables. Because we expect
a positive time trend in favor of generic drugs as practitioners get more familiar with them,
we include a variable for the time trend. Patient age and gender serve to control for demo-
graphic effects. Also, political attitudes and institutions vary between cantons. In some, PD
is widely accepted or even desired while in others, it is disputed. Moreover, unobserved
detailing effort by pharmaceutical companies likely differs between cantons. This calls for
the inclusion of 25 cantonal dummies, with Zurich constituting the reference category. Indi-
viduals can also purchase complementary insurance that covers additional procedures (such
as traditional Chinese medicine or otherwise uncovered drugs). These dimensions of comple-
mentary insurance likely reflect risk aversion on the part of consumers, making them eschew
drug substitution because they are less familiar with the generic alternative.
Drug substitution may also depend on dosage and package size. The reason is that the
unobserved contribution to physician income could vary with these two parameters. There-
fore, total prescribed dose (number of pills times dosage per pill) is included in the regression.
The number of prescriptions per patient controls for long-run chronic patients. Because there
is a high likelihood that a patient initiated with a given variety of the drug remains with it,
two dummies indicate whether the patient’s first prescription took place in 2006 or 2007,
when the higher coinsurance rate was already in place.
The deterministic part of utility for generics is estimated as
Vi jgt = b0 + b1PD + b2GP + b3PD · GP + b4DED2 + b5PD · DED2 + b6DED3
+b7PD · DED3 + b8COINS + b9PD · COINS + b10HOSP + b11ACC
+b12HIA + b13P + b14PD · P + b15HMO + b16GATE + bx X, (5)
where the b’s are the parameters of interest, X denotes the vector of control variables, and
bx the vector of coefficients of the control variables. The patient-specific deductible level
(DED) is included using two dummies DED2 (CHF 1,000 or 1,500) and DED3 (CHF 2,000
or 2,500), respectively. The base category is DED1 for individuals with a deductible of CHF
300 or 500.
Data
Chemical agents selected
The data was provided by a major Swiss health insurer covering about 15 % of the Swiss
population. They relate to the years 2005–2007. The chemical agents selected for analysis
are omeprazole (O), amlodipine (A), and ciprofloxacin (C).10 Omeprazole is used to treat
10 ATC-code: omeprazole (A02BC01), amlodipine (C08CA01), ciprofloxacin (J01MA02). For more details
about the investigated agents see www.drugbank.ca/drugs.
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Fig. 1 Share of brand-name drug between March, 2005 and December, 2007
gastric and duodenal abscesses; amlodipine is a calcium channel blocker for the treatment of
angina; ciprofloxacin is used to treat specific bacterial infections. Their choice can be justified
on the grounds that they have many bioequivalent generic competitors that are available on
the Swiss market.11 Furthermore, these agents belong to the therapeutic categories with
substantial sales volume, causing the number of prescriptions in the data to be high. We
observe 183,874 (O), 143,358 (A), and 95,580 (C) prescriptions where exactly one package
was sold.
The shares of the three brand-name drugs in the sample are depicted in Fig. 1 for 33 months,
starting from March 2005. They dropped throughout 2005, quite likely because prescribing
physicians anticipated the increase of coinsurance for certain brand-name drugs from 10 to
20 % effective January 2006. The new rate was to apply to brand-name drugs whose sales
price was 20 % higher than the cheapest therapeutically equivalent generic.12 During the first
months of 2006, this was the case for all three agents. However, the brand-name producers
of amlodipine and ciprofloxacin lowered their prices in month 20 (August, 2006) in order
to avoid the extra copayment. In month 29 (May, 2007), the producer of the brand-name for
omeprazole lowered its prices as well, but only for the most commonly prescribed dose (10
mg).
As to amlodipine, the brand-name drug (Norvasc®) went off patent in the spring of 2005,
causing it to lose its monopoly position. Since then, the generic Amlodipin-Mepha® has
expanded its share in the sample from 18 to 37 % (2006) and to 38 % (2007), respectively.
Physician and patient descriptors
In the data set, there are 7,441 physicians prescribing O, 5,995 prescribing A, and 7,693 pre-
scribing C , respectively (the three subsets are overlapping); the share of PD varies between 43
11 Number of generics available on the Swiss market (2005–2007): omeprazole (11), amlodipine (12),
ciprofloxacin (11).
12 This is regulated by national law (specifically paragraph Art.38a KLV).
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Omeprazole Amlodipine Ciprofloxacin
MN MD SD MN MD SD MN MD SD
PD 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.54 1.00 0.50
General practitioner (GP) 0.84 1.00 0.37 0.88 1.00 0.32 0.78 1.00 0.42
Patient’s deductible (DED) 406 300 297 386 300 246 477 300 413
Increased rate of coinsurance (COINS) 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.40
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Accident insurance (ACC) 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.68 1.00 0.47
High-income area (HIA) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.17
Urban area 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.40 0.00 0.49
Suburban area 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.25 0.00 0.43
Average price difference (P) 102 71 75 28 11 30 12 8 9
HMO contract (HMO) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.14
Gatekeeping contract (GATE) 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.24
Complementary insured (COMP) 0.87 1.00 0.33 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.90 1.00 0.31
Patient’s age (in years) 62 64 17 70 72 12 58 61 19
Patient’s sex (male = 1) 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.49
Total dosage (in 100 mg) 9.99 11.20 5.90 6.20 5.00 2.80 61.26 50.00 28.60
Prescriptions per patient 7.84 6.00 7.55 8.05 8.00 4.02 2.83 2.00 3.78
First prescription in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
First prescription in 2007 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2006 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.36 0.00 0.48
Share of prescriptions in 2007 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.48
Note Descriptive statistics are mean (MN), median (MD), and standard deviation (SD). The prescription is the
unit of observation used for calculating the statistics. We use nine regional categories in the regression, but
only the three most important categories are displayed here
and 54 % from March 2005 to December 2007. With 78–88 %, the majority of the prescribers
are GPs rather than specialists.
The median deductible is the lowest possible (CHF 300). During the study period, about
70 % of omeprazol prescriptions were subject to the increased rate of coinsurance while this
share was lower for amlodipine and ciprofloxacin with shares of 21 and 20 %, respectively.
The share of consumers with extra hospital coverage lies between 22 and 27 %. The majority
of physicians have their practice in urban (36–40 %) or suburban (25–27 %) areas while only
3 % are located in high-income areas. The average savings per prescription for a patient or
insurer due to the substitution of the brand-name by a generic counterpart is highest for O
with CHF 102, followed by CHF 28 and CHF 12 for A and C , respectively. The share of
insured with an HMO policy varies between 2 and 3 %, of those with a gatekeeping policy,
between 5 and 6 %. In contrast, between 87 and 90 % of the insured had signed up for at least
one voluntary extra option to broaden the scope of reimbursed services. High shares of 68 and
83 % have purchased accident insurance. Both the 61,825 patients receiving O and the 27,080
patients receiving C have an average age of about 60 years, and 40 % are male. The 58,489
patients obtaining A have an average age of 70 years, and 48 % are male. Ciprofloxacin is
prescribed with an average total dosage per prescription of 6,126 mg, compared to a dosage
of 999 mg for O and 620 mg for A. On average, a patient receives 8 prescriptions if in need
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of O or A. In contrast, C is prescribed three times per patient on average. Observations are
distributed equally over the three years, with about one third of prescriptions taking place
per year. Also, the number of patients starting medication is roughly constant over the years.
Estimation results
The odds ratios (ORs) and standard errors resulting from the random-effects logit model
described in Sect. 5 are displayed in Tables 4, 5.13 The physician-specific variance component
contributes 50–70 % of the total error variance, and a likelihood-ratio test clearly speaks
in favor of the random-effects specification. The physician-specific variance component is
higher than the 40 % reported by Lundin (2000) and 29 % reported by Hellerstein (1998).
A possible explanation is that some physicians in our dataset only have a small number of
patients, the data coming from one insurer only. Moreover, the available information does
not permit to distinguish between part-time and full-time, female and male, and younger and
older physicians. Coscelli (1998) also mentions considerable physician-specific components
in unexplained variance.
Testing for the influence of physician dispensing
Hypothesis 1 predicts that PD increases the likelihood of generic prescription. It is tested
by Model 1, with physician and patient characteristics controlled for. Additional hypothesis
testing calls for interaction terms involving PD and patient characteristics which are added in
Model 2 (to be discussed in Sect. 7.2). Therefore, the coefficient of PD in Model 1 shows the
average OR across physician and patient groups. In the case of O , it amounts to 3.0 (2.6, 3.4),
with the parentheses indicating its 95 % confidence interval.14 For a detailed discussion of its
calculation, see Norton et al. (2004) and Garrett (1997). The OR indicates that if the drug is
sold on the physician’s own account, the odds of generic substitution are three times higher
no matter whether the prescriber is a GP or a specialist. For all three agents, the likelihood of
generic substitution is around twice as high among GPs than among specialists. Moreover,
the interaction between PD and GP yields a positive and significant coefficient in the case
of A and C . This could be a sign that GPs with their lower average income, hence higher
marginal utility of income, are more influenced by the income contribution of PD than their
specialized colleagues. In the case of O , the interaction of PD and GP was insignificant and
therefore excluded from the estimation.
The effect of (PD·GP) cannot be inferred from the interaction coefficient directly but needs
to be calculated according to the different categories (see Norton et al. 2004). In present case,
it is given by exp(βˆP D) for specialists and exp(βˆP D + βˆP D·G P ) for GPs. For amlodipine,
PD has an OR of 2.4 (1.9, 2.9) for specialists and 3.7 (3.4, 4.1) for GPs, indicating that
PD has a much stronger effect among GPs than among specialists. In the case of C , the
discrepancy between GPs and specialists is even stronger. Dispensing specialists reveal a
negative PD effect with an OR of 0.7 (0.6, 0.8), while GPs again exhibit a positive PD
effect on generic substitution with an OR of 2.9 (2.6, 3.3). All the OR values discussed have
confidence intervals that do not include 1 and thus are significant.
13 The concept of odds ratios and their calculation in the presence of interaction terms can be found in Hosmer
and Lemeshow (2000).
14 The 95 % confidence interval is calculated according to C I = exp(βˆ ± 1.96 · ŜE(βˆ)), where βˆ is the
logit coefficient. Because Tables 5 show ORs, the reader can calculate the necessary quantities according to
βˆ = ln(̂O R) and ŜE(βˆ) = ŜE(̂O R)/̂O R using the values from the table.
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Table 5 Estimated odd-ratios from logistic regression (generics = 1),
Omeprazole (O) Amlodipine (A) Ciprofloxacin (C)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
PD 2.99∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.06) (0.07)
General practitioner (GP) 2.12∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Interaction of PD and GP 1.58∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.17) (0.42) (0.42)
Deductible category DED2a 2.01∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗ 1.06 1.02 1.07
(0.17) (0.23) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Interaction of PD and DED2 0.70∗ 1.26∗ 0.90
(0.13) (0.17) (0.08)
Deductible category DED3a 1.95∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗ 1.25 1.42∗∗ 1.12 1.20
(0.39) (0.66) (0.18) (0.25) (0.11) (0.16)
Interaction of PD and DED3 0.51 0.71 0.85
(0.21) (0.20) (0.17)
Increased coinsurance (COINS) 2.04∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 4.52∗∗∗ 4.58∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 2.26∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09) (0.11)
Interaction of PD and COINS 1.35∗∗∗ 0.97 0.88∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Extra hospital insurance (HOSP) 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Accident insurance (ACC) 0.80∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.97 0.97
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
High-income area (HIA)b 0.47∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.91 0.91
(0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17)
Price difference (P, in 10 CHF) 1.03∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗ 0.93∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Interaction of PD and P 0.97∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
HMO contract (HMO)c 1.94∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.15) (0.15)
Gatekeeping contract (GATE)c 2.43∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Complementary insurance (COMP) 1.15∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 1.00 1.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time trend (in months) 1.03∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.08∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient age (in 5 years) 1.01∗∗ 1.01∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Patient sex (male = 1) 1.26∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 1.02 1.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
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Table 5 continued
Omeprazole (O) Amlodipine (A) Ciprofloxacin (C)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Tot. dosage (in 100 mg) 0.93∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.00∗ 1.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Prescription per patient 0.94∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
First prescription in 2006 1.33∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
First prescription in 2007 1.38∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.04∗ 1.04∗ 1.09∗ 1.09∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Log-likelihood at convergence: −35,970 −35,918 −51,481 −51,473 −29,390 −29,388
Observations/physicians 183,874/7,441 143,358/5,995 95,580/7,693
Note Standard errors displayed in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10;
six additional area and 25 cantonal dummies are included but not shown here a DED2 = CHF 1,000 or 1,500,
DED3 = CHF 2,000 or 2,500 Ref. categories are: b urban area, c basic insurance
In summary, Hypothesis 1 receives a good deal of support, permitting one to conclude
that PD increases the likelihood of generic substitution due to its higher contribution to
physician income. This conclusion holds regardless of whether prescribers are GPs or not
and for all of the three chemical substances analyzed, with the one exception of specialized
physicians prescribing C . However, it should be noted that there may be additional reasons
for dispensing physicians to choose the cheaper generic drug. First, storage entails capital
user cost, which is lower for cheap generics. Second, dispensing physicians may be better
informed about availability and prices of generics than non-dispensing physicians because
of especially targeted marketing activities. Unfortunately, these effects cannot be analyzed
with the available data.
As pointed out in Sect. 3.1, physicians who are strongly attached to money might open
practice in PD regions. This selection effect would result in an overestimation of the PD
coefficient. However, this bias cannot be very important because during the observation
period, a ban on new practices was in effect that was lifted no sooner than at the end of 2011.
Therefore, physicians had to buy existing practices, which served their choice of location. In
addition, most physicians prefer to settle in their respective region of origin, and they tend to
stay where they started their practice.15
Still, PD is associated with increased generic substitution. It contributes to lower phar-
maceutical expenditure as long as it does not go along with an increase in drug use through
supplier-induced demand. This qualification is not addressed here but is analyzed in other
recent work. In particular, Rischatsch (2012) analyzes whether dispensing physicians opti-
mize their income contribution from drug dispensing by selling smaller packages, while
15 We additionally compared the prescribing behavior of non-dispensing physicians from regions where PD
is prohibited with those located in communities that allow PD. While the first type of physicians might want
to sell drugs but lack authorization, the latter type is free to dispense but does not size the opportunity to
do so. Hence, the second type serves as a reference group, comprised of physicians that are not (or at least
comparatively less) prone to financial incentives, because they let go on profits from drug selling. We found
no empirical evidence for a difference in prescribing patterns between non-PD across cantons for the two
substances omeprazole and amlodipine. For the third substance (ciprofloxacin), the likelihood of generic
substitution is significantly lower in cantons with a less restrictive stance with regard to PD.
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Trottmann (2011) looks at the impact of PD on total expenditure for drugs, general practi-
tioners’ services, specialists’ services and hospital services.
The role of physician agency on behalf of patients
To the extent that physicians take the consequences of their prescriptions for the utility of
their patients into account, Hypothesis 2 predicts a positive relationship between copayment
and generic substitution. Patients with a higher deductible face a higher expected level of
copayment; therefore, they should be more likely to receive the generic alternative. The
empirical evidence comes from the coefficients of DED2 and DED3 in Model 2 of Table 5.
In the case of O , the ORs for DED2 and DED3 indicate that a higher deductible increases
the likelihood of generic substitution. A stronger effect for DED3 compared to DED2 could
not be found for O , however. Patients with a deductible in excess of the legal minimum
are two times as likely to receive a generic drug, which supports Hypothesis 2. For A, the
ORs increase from the lowest to the highest deductible category, but only the OR for DED2
is statistically significant. The tendency is the same for C but the effect is insignificant.
The dummy variable indicating the 2006 increase in coinsurance for expensive brand-names
(COINS) is strongly positive for all chemical agents, again supporting Hypothesis 2 (see
Table 2).
Hypothesis 3 revolves around patient income, stating that richer patients are less likely
to receive the generic drug. In Table 5, three indicators are used, viz. the purchase of extra
hospital insurance, accident insurance, and residence in a high-income area. As to the first
indicator, the OR values are consistently below one, indicating that generic drug substitution
indeed is less likely. The same is also true for patients with accident insurance and from high-
income areas in two of the three cases (C is the exception with a negative but insignificant
effect). Therefore, there is some supporting evidence for Hypothesis 3 (see Table 2 again).
Hypothesis 4 predicts that patients’ rate of coinsurance is less influential in the PD mode
than in the pharmacy mode. To test it, Model 2 contains interactions between the DED
dummies and PD. The interaction terms are generally negative, but only the medium category
for O is significant, giving some support to Hypothesis 4. Here, the OR for DED2 is 2.2 (1.8,
2.7) for non-PD and 1.6 (1.1, 2.1) for PD. Evidence contradicting Hypothesis 4 comes from A,
where the interaction effect PD·DED2 is positive and significant but the main effect DED2
is insignificant, leading to the conclusion that non-PD providers do not react to a higher
deductible but PD providers do. This difference vanishes again at the highest deductible level
since PD·DED3 does not reach statistical significance.
A second test of Hypothesis 4 is provided by the interaction of PD with COINS. However,
the evidence is inconclusive. For omeprazole, PD·COINS is highly significant and positive
with an OR of 1.9 (1.7, 2.0) among non-PD providers and 2.6 (2.3, 2.8) PD providers,
respectively, while for ciprofloxacin, it is weakly significant but negative, suggesting that PD
providers react less to the increase in the rate of coinsurance than their non-PD colleagues. No
significant difference could be found for amlodipine. Hence, the evidence does not permit to
either confirm or reject the notion that drug dispensing weakens physician agency on behalf
of the patient.
The role of physician agency on behalf of insurers
Hypothesis 5 states that given agency on behalf of insurers, non-PD providers prescribe
generic drugs in spite of higher information cost. Therefore, we expect a higher difference
between brand-name and generic prices (pbt − pgt ) to be positively related to the probability
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of prescribing the cheaper generic drug. While the estimates for O support Hypothesis 5 with
a weak positive effect in favor of generics, the estimates for A and C do not because an increase
in the price difference lowers the probability of generic substitution slightly. However, there
is other evidence hinting at agency on behalf of insurers. In fact, the descriptive statistics in
Table 3 show that, for the three selected agents, the share of generic drugs is 66–89 % in our
dataset even in the non-PD market. Recall that non-PD providers do not benefit financially
from drug choice, while patient coinsurance beyond the deductible is rather limited compared
to average income in Switzerland. Therefore, the high share of generic drugs shows that some
physicians choose the lower-priced alternative even in situations when neither they nor their
patients derive significant financial benefit from it. It takes agency toward the insurers to
motivate physicians to prescribe generic drugs despite higher information cost.
The interaction PD·P is again used to test whether the financial incentives attached to PD
weaken physician agency. The price difference being part of both the second and the third
term of Eq. (2), both agency on behalf of the patient and on the behalf of the insurer can be
affected. For O , the price difference has an OR of 1.0 (1.03, 1.05) for non-PD physicians and
an OR of 1.01 (1.00, 1.02) for PD physicians, pointing to a weakly negative association of PD
and agency. The opposite is observed in the case of A, where the OR pertaining to non-PD
providers is 0.81 (0.80, 0.82) and the OR pertaining to PD providers is 0.83 (0.82, 0.83).
For C , no significant difference between non-PD and PD providers is observed, with ORs
amounting to 0.93 (0.88, 0.99) and 0.94 (0.88, 1.00), respectively. Therefore, the evidence
with regard to the interaction of PD and agency is inconclusive.
With respect to Hypothesis 6, the managed-care variables ‘HMO’ and ‘gatekeeping’ reveal
an increasing likelihood of generic substitution for all three chemical agents, with ORs
between 1.4 and 2.0, as predicted (see Table 2).
Control variables
The control variables lead to the following conclusions. In Model 2 of Table 5, there is
evidence for the expected positive time trend towards generic drugs, a higher likelihood of
generics being prescribed to men compared to women, and no evidence of the total amount
of dosage prescribed having influence on the choice of drug version. The negative sign
pertaining to the number of prescriptions observed per patient can be interpreted as follows.
From the physician’s perspective, repeated prescriptions make it more profitable to convince
a patient to accept generics. From the patient’s perspective, however, a high quantity of drugs
prescribed increases the likelihood of exceeding the deductible, beyond which insurance
coverage sets in, undermining interest in generics. Apparently, this second effect prevails.16
Finally, the year when the patient’s medication started is important for drug choice and
significant for all three chemical agents. Patients who received the first prescription in 2006
are between 1.2 and 1.3 times more likely to be prescribed a generic. In the case of amlodipine
and ciprofloxacin, the likelihood for 2007 is higher than for 2005 but lower than for 2006.
This could reflect the fact that the two pertinent brand-name producers lowered their price in
the interest of a decreased coinsurance rate, enabling them to regain market-share. By way of
16 The theoretical model focuses on the first prescription, neglecting decisions with regard to follow-up
prescriptions. In an attempt to make the econometrics match theory more closely, an estimation using only
the first observation per patient was performed as well. The odds-ratios are 2.84 (0.38) for omeprazole, 1.90
(0.16) [specialists] and 6.84 (0.81) [GPs] for amlodipine, and 1.04 (0.11) [specialists] and 6.77 (0.72) [GPs] for
ciprofloxacin, respectively. Therefore, the conclusions based on Table 5 seems to hold regardless of whether
physicians decide about a first or a follow-up prescription.
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contrast, the brand-name producer of omeprazole waited until 2007, causing it to lose market
share in both years.
One might criticize that dispensing physicians do not react to an individual patient when
choosing between g and b because they have already decided what pharmaceuticals to have in
their portfolio. However, they are likely to make this choice anticipating the kind of patients
they will face from past visits, causing them to store the drugs that best match their clientele.
Policy implications
Assessing the welfare effect of PD is not within the scope of this study. It would require an
analysis of frequencies and volumes of drug prescriptions as well as patient preferences with
regard to drug suppliers.17 Nonetheless, the previously discussed results allow us to assess
potential savings through generic substitution due to PD.
The marginal effect (ν) of PD on the likelihood of a generic prescription (not shown in
Table 5) measures the expected change in market share due to PD. We assume that the relative
market share for generic provider within the market for generics remains unaffected by the
generic substitution. Then, potential savings (S) due to PD can be calculated according to
S =
∑
i
Si =
∑
i
ν · ni · ( p¯bi − p¯gi ), (6)
where ni indicates the total number of prescribed packages per category i depending on
dosage and pills per package. The average patient prices for brand-name and generic drugs
are denoted by p¯b and p¯g , respectively.
In the case of omeprazole, the market share for generics increases by 4 %-points due to PD
(ν = 0.04). In our sample, total expenditure for omeprazole are CHF 19,247,704 and savings
due to generic substitution through PD are CHF 773,100 or 4 % (see Table 6 in the Appendix).
For amlodipine (ν = 0.15), the market share for generics increases by 15 %-points, resulting
in savings of CHF 1,211,677, which equals 10 % of total cost.18 In comparison, potential
savings for ciprofloxacin (ν = 0.06) are lower with CHF 87,997 (1.85 % of CHF 4,751,284).
In sum, the findings show that generic substitution through PD leads to a remarkable decrease
in drug expenditure which is unlikely to be compensated by supplier-induced demand since
Swiss health insurers have began to closely monitor physician’s drug bills. Trottmann (2011)
finds that generic substitution through PD has a negative effect on drug expenditure, which
is not overcompensated as a result of supplier-induced demand. Nevertheless, a thorough
analysis of possible welfare implications, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is an
interesting topic for future research. For a further discussion see also Rischatsch (2012).
Conclusions
This research analyzes the role of physicians’ and patients’ financial incentives in the choice
between generic and brand-name drugs. Prescribing the generic alternative takes more effort
17 Cost containment through cheaper generic drugs could be (over) compensated through unnecessarily pre-
scribed drugs.
18 To facilitate the calculation, all models are estimated without an interaction of PD and GP. Further, one
has to keep in mind that the brand-name drug went off patent in the first month of the study period. This
contributes to a strong effect of PD because physicians with dispensing rights are targeted by sales activities
and are immediately informed about market entry of new generic drugs.
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on the part of the physician for two main reasons: First, she needs to acquire information about
new drugs which enter the market only after patent expiration of the brand name. Second, she
needs to convince the patient that the cheaper generic is not of lower quality. The physician
is willing to make this effort only if the benefit from choosing the generic is sufficiently high.
Generic drugs have higher benefit because of three reasons, namely financial benefits, agency
towards the patient, and agency towards insurers. The influence of these three components
is estimated using a large set of drug claims data from Switzerland.
Regarding financial incentives, this data is ideal for analysis because some – but not
all – Swiss physicians have the right to dispense drugs on their own account. Physicians
with this privilege derive a significant part of their income from the sale of drugs, causing
financial incentives associated with drug dispensing to be substantial. PD is found to be
associated with a higher likelihood of prescribing generic drugs, which is likely due to
a higher contribution to physician income in comparison with that of brand-name drugs
(Hypothesis 1; see also Table 2). A limitation of our analysis is that we are unable to separate
this effect from other differences between dispensing and non-dispensing physicians. In
particular, information costs for prescribing generic drugs might be lower for dispensing
physicians as they are targeted by sales representatives and may therefore be better informed
about availability and prices of drugs than their non-dispensing colleagues. Additionally,
dispensing physicians have to finance and manage storage, tying up capital and causing
opportunity costs.
Turning to agency towards patients, we test whether physicians respond to the financial
burden caused by copayment. Choosing the lower-priced generic drug serves to decrease
this burden without affecting the quality of medication due to bioequivalence of the generic
substitutes studied here. We find that the likelihood of receiving the generic increases for
patients with a higher deductible (Hypothesis 2). In addition, the rate of coinsurance (which
applies when the deductible is exceeded) was increased for certain brand-name drugs during
our observation period. Although this change caused but a small additional burden per patient
compared to income, it does go along with a strongly increased use of generic drugs. A likely
contributor is that the government’s initiative to promote generic substitution alloyed concerns
about quality on the part of both prescribers and patients.
The variation in deductibles and coinsurance permits to study the interaction between
physicians’ financial incentives and their patient agency. Given imperfect agency on behalf
of patients, dispensing physicians are predicted to respond less strongly to a hike in copayment
than non-dispensing ones (Hypothesis 4). However, the evidence found in our data is mixed,
failing to support the notion that drug dispensing weakens physician agency, as argued by
pharmacists’ lobbying groups and some Swiss politicians.
Moreover, most of the odds ratios pertaining to proxies of patient income (residence in a
high-income area, purchase of extra hospital and accident insurance) suggest that wealthier
patients have a higher probability of receiving brand-name drugs because the price difference
between them and the generic substitute has less of an effect due to lower marginal utility of
income of the wealthy (Hypothesis 3).
Consideration of the savings for insurers might provide an additional motivation for the
prescription of the cheaper generic alternative (Hypothesis 5). However, this effect could
be confirmed for only one drug in the econometric estimation (see Table 2 again). Nev-
ertheless, the high willingness of non-dispensing physicians to prescribe generic drugs
points to some degree of agency towards insurers. Last but not least, physicians work-
ing in managed care-type arrangements are found to prescribe more generic drugs than
their colleagues, pointing to an increased cost awareness in the managed care setting
(Hypothesis 6).
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In sum, financial incentives, agency towards the patient, and agency towards insurers
are all found to markedly influence generic substitution. Moreover, government initiatives
to promote generic drugs can be effective even in the presence of weak financial incen-
tives because they may reassure physicians and patients of the safety and high quality of
generic drugs. However, if government were to try to markedly reduce generic prices, it
might weaken the incentives for generic substitution, at least for dispensing physicians.
The reason is that physicians’ financial incentives may encourage rather than undermine
generic substitution.
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Appendix
See Table 6.
Table 6 Savings due to generic substitution through PD (omeprazole, 2005–2007)
Category Quantity Average prices Drug cost and changes
i ni p¯bi p¯
g
i T Ci Si %
10 mg
×14 546 50.15 28.62 17,197 470 2.73
×28 2,288 75.20 45.64 114,482 2,705 2.36
×56 2,583 131.12 79.88 235,796 5,293 2.24
×98 470 – 127.82 60,078 – –
×100 3,967 219.02 128.67 575,045 14,337 2.49
20 mg
×7 4,260 46.62 22.48 101,092 4,113 4.07
×14a 18,356 70.98 33.42 636,462 20,611 3.24
×28 42,518 118.64 56.53 2,627,267 105,637 4.02
×56 30,719 213.42 106.95 3,768,254 130,824 3.47
×98 5,887 – 136.54 803,801 – –
×100 36,310 362.57 143.88 6,179,657 316,754 5.13
40 mg
×7a 7,560 66.88 26.35 205,090 6,133 2.99
×28 34,868 195.00 75.82 2,927,608 166,223 5.68
×56 8,833 – 112.74 – 995,875 –
Total 19,247,704 773,100 4.02
Note Total prescribed packages (ni ), total cost (T Ci ) and potential savings (Si ) per category. Prices and costs
are shown in CHF.1 CHF≈1.1 USD at 2011 exchange ratesa The market share is only increased up to 100 %
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